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Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 017879 TOSEC 010212

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AD, UR

SUBJECT: DRAFT REMARKS SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA

FOLLOWING IS REVISED DRAFT TEXT OF SECRETARY'S REMARKS

TO SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA -

JANUARY 29, 1976.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN TO

YOU AND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHY THE PRESIDENT AND I

BELIEVE THAT IMPORTANT AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE IN

THE SOVIET EFFORT TO IMPOSE A MINORITY FACTION ON THE

ANGOLAN PEOPLE WITH THE FORCE OF ITS ARMS AND CUBAN TROOPS.
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THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO HELP BUILD A NEW INTERNATION-

AL STRUCTURE IN WHICH PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED BY NEGOTIATION

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AND COOPERATION RATHER THAN BY CONFRONTATION OR CONFLICT

OF ARMS. CENTRAL TO OUR POLICY IS THE EFFORT TO EASE

TENSIONS WITH THE OTHER NUCLEAR SUPERPOWER, THE SOVIET

UNION. TO THIS END WE HAVE SOUGHT TO BUILD MORE RATIONAL

RELATIONS WIT THE USSR ACROSS A BROAD RANGE -- TO

CONTAIN STRATEGIC ARMS, TO INSTITUTIONALIZE COOPERATION

IN ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS, TO REDUCE

TENSIONS IN AREAS WHERE OUR VITAL INTERESTS IMPINGE ON

EACH OTHER SUCH AS BERLIN, AND TO AVOID DESTABILIZING

CONFRONTATIONS IN PERIPHERAL AREAS OF THE GLOBE -- SUCH

AS ANGOLA. IF NOT EFFECTIVELY COUNTERED, THE SOVIET

ATTEMPT TO TAKE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OF THIS TURBULENT

LOCAL SITUATION COULD ULTIMATELY UNDERMINE PROGRESS IN

ALL OTHER AREAS WHERE WE HAVE SOUGT TO EASE TENSIONS.

THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS SOVIET ACTIONS IN ANGOLA

TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH A GENUINE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS.

WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR INTERVENTION INTO AN AREA WHERE

THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY HISTORIC SOVIET OR CUBAN

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INTEREST REPRESENTS A WHOLLY UNNECESSARY SETBACK

TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRENDS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

IT IS IN NEITHER THE SOVIET NOR THE WORLD INTEREST.

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED

TO ACCEPT PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT FOR ITSELF THAT IT

CONSIDERS THE SOVIET MOVE IN ANGOLA AS RUNNING COUNTER TO

THE CRUCIAL PRINCIPLES OF AVOIDANCE OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE

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AND SCRUPULOUS CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS WHICH

WE HAVE JOINTLY ENUNCIATED.

OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD MORE STABLE, PEACEFUL AND RELIABLE

RELATIONS WITH TE SOVIET UNION MUST BE BASED UPON OUR

NATIONAL STRENGTH, RESOLUTION AND UNITY. THE U.S. IS

DETERMINED TO BUILD UPON THE HOPEFUL NEW TRENDS IN OUR

RELATIONS, BUT FOR THAT VERY REASON WE CANNOT AFFORD TO

DEPRIVE OURSELVES OF INFLUENCE WHILE WATCHING THE SOVIET

UNION USE THE IMPROVED CLIMATE ACHIEVED THUS FAR AS AN

INVITATION TO SELECTIVELY EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES.

BY ITS ACTIONS, THE SENATE HAS DEPRIVED THE PRESIDENT

OF INDISPENSABLE FLEXIBILITY IN FORMULATING A FOREIGN

POLICY WHICH I BELIEVE TO BE IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

THE CONSEQUENCES MAY BE FAR-REACHING. IT MUST BE CLEAR
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THAT WHEN ONE GREAT POWER ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A SPECIAL

POSITION OF INFLUENCE BASED ON MILITARY INTERVENTION AND

WHICH THREATENS TO BRING ABOUT A GLOBAL IMBALANCE, THE

OTHER POWER WILL SOONER OR LATER ACT TO OFFSET THIS

ADVANTAGE. THIS WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO A CHAIN OF

ACTION AND REACTION TYPICAL OF OTHER HISTORIC ERAS IN

WHICH GREAT POWERS MANEUVERED FOR ADVANTAGE, ONLY TO FIND

'HEMSELVES SOONER OR LATER EMBROILED IN MAJOR CRISES AND

INDEED IN OPEN CONFLICT.

IT IS PRECISELY THIS PATTERN THAT MUST BE BROKEN IF A

LASTING EASING OF TENSIONS IS TO BE ACHIEVED. AND IT MUST

BE BROKEN NOW.

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IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE HAVE FRAMED OUR GOALS

IN ANGOLA. SIMPLY PUT, WE WISH TO SEE A CEASEFIRE -- AN

END TO THE TRAGIC BLOODSHED IN THAT COUNTRY; WITHDRAWAL

OF ALL OUTSIDE FORCES; CESSATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY

INVOLVEMENT; AND NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE ANGOLAN FACTIONS.

WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION THAT EMERGES FROM

AFRICAN EFFORTS. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE SOVIET

INTERVENTION, AN AFRICAN SOLUTION WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN

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ACHIEVED IN ANGOLA.

WE ARE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT WHO COMES TO POWER IN

ANGOLA, THAN ABOUT HOW THEY COME TO POWER. WE HAVE

CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT

REPRESENTING ALL THREE FACTIONS IN ANGOLA. WE HAVE NEVER

BEEN OPPOSED TO PARTICIPATION IN AN ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT

BY THE SOVIET-BACKED POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION

OF ANGOLA, THE MPLA -- BUT WE DO OPPOSE THE SOVIET AND

CUBAN INTERVENTION AND THEIR EXPRESSED AIM TO DENY THE

OTHER TWO GROUPS ANY PART IN THE GOVERNING OF ANGOLA.

FOR THE US TO BE FOUND WANTING IN AFRICA AS A

CREDIBLE FRIEND, PRECISELY AT THE TIME WHEN A GROUP OF

,ODERATE STATES HAS CLEARLY EXPRESSED ITS FERVENT HOPE

THAT THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY 0ALANCE TO SOVIET

ASPIRATIONS WOULD BE A LOSS OF A IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY

FOR THE U.S. TO FIND FRIENDS IN AFRICA. EVEN MANY OF OUR

CRITICS LOOK TO US AS THE NATURAL COUNTER-BALANCE TO THE

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USSR AND THEIR ULTIMATE PROTECTION. YOU MAY BE SURE THAT

THE EVIDENCE THAT WE LACK THE WILL, IF NOT THE POWER TO

PLAY THIS ROLE, WILL HAVE FAR REACHING POLITICAL CONSE-

QUENCES.

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(UNDERSCORE) U.S. ACTIONS IN ANGOLA

LET ME BRIEFLY RECOUNT THE COURSE OF EVENTS T;AT HAS

LED US TO TIS POI;T. IN 1961, THE UNITED STATES DECLARED

ITS SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN

TERRITORIES. AT THE TIME, THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE

LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA) LAUNCHED A MAJOR OFFENSIVE.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, WE SOUGHT TO

DEVELOP A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FNLA THROUGH PRO-

VIDING IT SOME FINANCIAL, NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE

USSR HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED LINKS WITH THE POPULAR

MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) THROUGH

THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE MPLA BEGAN TO ENGAGE

IN ARMED HOSTILITIES IN THE MID-60'S. THE NATIONAL UNION

FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA), AN OFFSOOT

OF THE FNLA, ALSO BEGAN TO FIGHT ON A SMALL SCALE IN THE

LATE 1960'S. IN THE ENSUING YEARS, THE SOVIET UNION

AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES BECAME THE MAIN SOURCE OF

INSURGENT MILITARY TRAINING, ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

THE OVERTHROW OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT IN APRIL

1974 AND THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST

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PARTY APPARENTLY CONVINCED MOSCOW THAT A "REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION" WAS DEVELOPING IN ANGOLA WHICH IT SHOULD TRY TO EXPLOIT. THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN MODERATE SHIPMENTS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE MPLA IN THE LATE FALL OF 1974 WHILE WE TURNED DOWN REQUESTS THAT WE RECEIVED THEN. THE PROSPECT OF AN INDEPENDENT ANGOLA WAS CLOUDED BY THE INTENSE RIVALRY OF THE FNLA, MPLA AND UNITA WHICH HAD DEVELOPED OVER THE YEARS. CONCERNED ABOUT THE THREE FACTIONS' FAILURE TO END THEIR BITTER QUARREL, LEADERS OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES PREVAILED UPON THEM TO COME TOGETHER AND SEEK AGREEMENT. THIS EFFORT LED TO THE ALVOR ACCORD, OF JANUARY 1975. UNDER ITS TERMS A TRANSITIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT WAS TO BE ESTABLISHED AND CHARGED WITH PREPARING FOR A PEACEFUL TURNOVER OF POWER BY INTEGRATING THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE THREE MOVEMENTS, WRITING A CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIZING AN ELECTION TO TAKE PLACE AFTER INDEPENDENCE, SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 11, 1975.

THIS WAS THE MOMENT, WHEN PORTUGAL WAS TRYING TO ORGANIZE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, FOR THE EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT BY ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES. BUT THE CONFIDENTIAL

USSR AND PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS DECIDED TO PUT THE MPLA IN POWER IN ANGOLA THROUGH STEPPED UP SHIPMENTS OF ARMS. ENCOURAGED BY THE PROSPECTS OF SOVIET SUPPORT THE MPLA HAD LITTLE INCENTIVE TO ACCEPT THE ROLE OF MINORITY

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PARTNER IN ANY FUTURE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. IT IS NO
COINCIDENCE THAT MAJOR VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN MARCH 1975
WHEN LARGE SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET ARMS BEGAN TO ARRIVE,
THOUSANDS OF INFANTRY WEAPONS, MACHINE GUNS AND BAZOOKAS
-- WEAPONS THAT THE USSR MUST HAVE BEGUN TO ASSEMBLE AND
SHIP AS EARLY AS JANUARY.
ON MARCH 23 OF LAST YEAR THE FIRST OF REPEATED
MILITARY CLASHES BETWEEN MPLA AND FNLA OCCURRED. THEY
INCREASED IN FREQUENCY IN APRIL, MAY AND JUNE, WHEN
DELIVERIES OF COMMUNIST ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING
MORTARS AND ARMORED VEHICLES, CONTINUED TO FLOW IN
BY AIR AND SEA. IN MAY, THE MPLA FORCED THE FNLA OUT OF
THE AREAS NORTH AND EAST OF LUANDA AND, IN JUNE, TOOK
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF CABINDA. ON JULY 9 ALL-OUT CIVIL
WAR BEGAN WHEN THE MPLA ATTACKED THE FNLA AND UNITA,
DRIVING BOTH ORGANIZATIONS OUT OF LUANDA, THEREBY ENDING
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THE SHORT-LIVED COALITION GOVERNMENT.
AS THE MILITARY POSITION OF THE FNLA AND UNITA
DETERIORATED, THE GOVERNMENTS OF ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA GREW
MORE AND MORE CONCERNED. IT WAS IN THIS SITUATION THAT
THOSE TWO COUNTRIES TURNED TO THE US FOR ASSISTANCE IN
PREVENTING WHAT WAS INCREASINGLY BEING PERCEIVED AS A
SOVIET POWER PLAY TO PUT A RADICAL MINORITY FACTION IN
CONTROL OF ANGOLA, TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE IN SOUTH-
CENTRAL AFRICA, AND TO THREATEN THE STABILITY OF THE AREA.

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IN JANUARY 1975, IT WAS CLEAR THAT NEW SOVIET EQUIP-

MENT HAD MADE THE MPLA THE STRONGEST FACTION. OUR

CONCERN AT THAT TIME WAS TO PROVIDE THE FNLA WITH THE

MEANS TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY IN A POLITICAL, NOT A

MILITARY STRUGGLE. ACCORDINGLY, WE PROVIDED THE FNLA WITH

SOME $300,000 FOR POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WORK TO BE MADE

AVAILABLE IN SMALL MONTHLY INCREMENTS.

MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THIS $300,000, AS THOUGH IT

JUSTIFIED OR PROVOKED THE MASSIVE SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET

MILITARY EQUIPMENT. TO PUT THIS ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE,

THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN CONTRIBUTED MORE THAN $1.4

MILLION TO THE MPLA FOR SOCIAL ACTION BETWEEN JULY 1974

AND JUNE 1975. AND WE ESTIMATE THAT DURING THE FIRST

SIX MONTHS OF 1975, THE USSR SHIPPED MORE THAN $100

MILLION WORTH OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE MPLA.

IN MID-JULY 1975, THE MILITARY SITUATION HAD ALTERED

RADICALLY IN FAVOR OF THE MPLA . AT THIS POINT PRESIDENT

FORD DECIDED TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR HELP AND TO

PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE FNLA AND UNITA FORCES

THROUGH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. HE NOTIFIED THE

APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES OF HIS DECISION AND

ON LATER OCCASIONS KEPT THEM APPRISED OF THE SITUATION.

IN AUGUST, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATED THE PRESENCE

OF SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ADVISERS, TRAINERS AND

TROOPS, INCLUDING, WE BELIEVE, THE FIRST CUBAN COMBAT

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TROOPS. IF STATEMENTS BY CUBAN LEADERS ARE TO BE

BELIEVED, A LARGE CUBAN MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM

BEGAN IN ANGOLA IN JUNE. BY SEPTEMBER, THE MPLA OFFENSIVE

HAD FORCED UNITA OUT OF SEVERAL MAJOR CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN

ANGOLAN CITIES. IT CONTROLLED MOST OF THE COASTLINE

EXCEPT FOR A STRIP IN THE FAR NORTH, MUCH OF THE

SOUTH AND A WIDE BELT RUNNING FROM LUANDA TO THE ZAIRIAN

BORDER IN THE EAST.

CONCERN OVER THE MPLA SUCCESSES APPARENTLY WAS A

FACTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DECISION TO INTERVENE IN ANGOLA.

AT FIRST THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION WAS LIMITED TO

PROTECTION OF TWO DAM SITES BEING CONSTRUCTED IN PART

WITH SOUTH AFRICAN AID NEAR THE NAMIBIAN BORDER. BUT

IN EARLY SEPTEMBER THE POORLY EQUIPPED UNITA FORCES

TURNED IN DESPERATION TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR ASSISTANCE

AGAINST THE MPLA, WHICH WAS OVERRUNNING UNITA'S ETHNIC

AREAS IN THE SOUTH. SOUTH AFRICA RESPONDED BY SENDING

IN ARMS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND SOME 1,000 TO 1,500

TROOPS.

IN REACTING TO PROTECT WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS THEIR

OWN VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS, THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT NO

TIME CONSULTED THE UNITED STATES. WE DEPLORE THE ENTRY

OF SOUTH AFRICA INTO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT, FOR IT HAS

INEVITABLY WEAKENED POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE VICTIMS

OF SOVIET/CUBAN AGGRESSION. CERTAINLY THE FUROR

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ACCOMPANYING SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT HAS SERVED

TO MUTE AFRICAN CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION,

TO UNDERCUT AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR THE FNLA AND UNITA
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FORCES AND TO PROMOTE A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR OWN

POSITION.

THE ARRIVAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES LED TO A HIGHLY

SUCCESSFUL COUNTEROFFENSIVE WHICH SWEPT THE MPLA OUT OF

THE SOUTHERN AND MOST OF THE CENTRAL PART OF ANGOLA.

BY INDEPENDENCE DAY -- NOVEMBER 11 -- THE MPLA CONTROLLED

ONLY THE FORMER COLONIAL CAPITAL OF LUANDA AND A NARROW

BELT ACROSS NORTH-CENTRAL ANGOLA.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE MPLA'S REVERSE WAS

MASSIVELY TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND TO

HELP FERRY MORE CUBAN TROOPS TO ANGOLA. AND CUBA

INAUGURATED ITS OWN AIRLIFT OF TROOPS TO ANGOLA IN LATE

OCTOBER. THIS AIRLIFT CONTINUES. THE CUBAN

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IS NOW ESTIMATED AT OVER 10,000.

A TOTAL OF AT LEAST 46 FLIGHTS OF SOVIET HEAVY AND

MEDIUM MILITARY TRANSPORTS HAVE FERRIED SOVIET

MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE USSR TO LUANDA AND CONGO-

BRAZZAVILLE, WHILE A STEADY STREAM OF SOVIET AND CUBAN

AIRCRAFT HAS CONTINUED TO BRING CUBAN TROOPS ACROSS

THE ATLANTIC.

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DURING 1975 THE SOVIET UNION IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE

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SENT NEARLY $200 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY ARMS AND
EQUIPMENT TO ANGOLA. THIS APPROXIMATELY EQUALS THE
ENTIRE AMOUNT OF ALL MILITARY AID FROM ALL SOURCES
TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 1974. BY COMPARISON, US
ASSISTANCE HAS AMOUNTED TO ONLY $32 MILLION, MOST OF IT
IN TRANSPORT COSTS.
SOVIET ARMS HAVE INCLUDED INFANTRY WEAPONS, MACHINE
GUNS, BAZOOKAS, MORTARS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES, ARMORED
PERSONNEL CARRIERS, HEAVY ARTILLERY, LIGHT AND MEDIUM
TANKS, TRUCK-MOUNTED MULTITUBE ROCKET LAUNCHERS,
HELICOPTERS AND LIGHT AIRCRAFT. THERE ARE UNCOMFIRMED
REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL PROVIDE THE MPLA WITH
MIG-21 AIRCRAFT TO BE PILOTED BY CUBANS.
THE WEIGHT OF SOVIET AID AND ADVISORS, AND THE
CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE BEGAN TO TIP THE SCALES OF
BATTLE BY EARLY DECEMBER.
THE OAU: (UNDERSCORED)
IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE USSR, CUBA AND THE MPLA AND ITS
AFRICAN SUPPORTERS HOPED TO ACHIEVE A MAJOR MILITARY
VICTORY ON THE EVE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY'S EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN ADDIS ABABA
LAST MONTH. THEIR HOPE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE TO AFRICAN
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STATES THAT THE ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION WOULD BE AN
MPLA GOVERNMENT. YET NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REVERSES,
THE FNLA/UNITA FORCES STILL CONTROLLED ABOUT 70
PERCENT OF THE TERRITORY AND 70 PERCENT OF THE
POPULATION OF ANGOLA AT THE TIME OF THE CONFERENCE.
AN OAU RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WHICH MET IN 1975
TOOK THE POSITION THAT NONE OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA.
THE COMMISSION CALLED FOR A CEASE FIRE AND THE FORMATION
OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. THUS, THOSE GOVERN-

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MENTS WHICH RECOGNIZED THE MPLA WERE IN VIOLATION OF
A DECISION OF THE OAU.

AT THE JANUARY OAU SUMMIT, 22 MEMBERS OF THE OAU
ADVOCATED RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA AND CONDEMNATION OF
SOUTH AFRICA. BUT THEY WERE OPPOSED IN AN UNUSUAL
DEMONSTRATION OF SOLIDARITY BY 22 OTHER MEMBERS WHO
HELD OUT FOR A MORE BALANCED RESOLUTION, ONE THAT WOULD
INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: 1) AN IMMEDIATE CEASE
FIRE; 2) CONDEMNATION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES; 3) WITHDRAWAL
OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; 4) AN END TO THE SUPPLY OF ARMS
TO ALL FACTIONS; AND 5) RECONCILIATION OF ALL FACTIONS
WITH THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL
UNITY -- A PROGRAM WHICH WE REGARD AS REASONABLE AND
RESPONSIVE TO THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION. BUT MPLA
SUPPORTERS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT A SOLUTION THAT
DID NOT INCLUDE RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA AS THE SOLE
GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. THEIR OPPONENTS WERE EQUALLY
DETERMINED. THE SUMMIT ENDED IN IMPASSE.

THE US POSITION

MANY AMERICANS AND MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON ANGOLA. EVEN THE
MODEST AID WE HAVE PROVIDED IS SEEN AS A DANGEROUS
STEP TOWARD ANOTHER VIET-NAM.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ASSURED THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN

PEOPLE THAT NO AMERICAN TROOPS WILL EVER SERVE IN
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ANGOLA IN ANY CAPACITY. OUR AID HAS AMOUNTED TO TENS
OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, NOT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS.
INDEED THE VERY REASON WE HAVE TAKEN THESE STEPS IS
TO ENSURE THAT A DEEPER INVOLVEMENT WOULD NOT
EVENTUALLY BE CALLED FOR. OUR OBJECTIVE ON THE GROUND
IN ANGOLA HAS BEEN THE VERY LIMITED ONE OF HELPING
THE FNAL AND UNITA MAINTAIN A MILITARY CAPABILITY
SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT A SOVIET-BACKED MPLA VICTORY.

LET ME SAY TOO THAT WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY
AMERICAN MERCENARIES IN ANGOLA. I CANNOT GUARANTEE
THAT SOME AMERICAN MERCENARY MAY NOT HAVE SOLD HIS
SERVICES TO ONE OF THE FIGHTING PARTIES. BUT I CAN
ASSURE YOU NONE HAS BEEN RECRUITED, HIRED, TRAINED,
PAID OR TRANSPORTED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY ANY
AGENCY OF THE US GOVERNMENT. NOR ARE WE TRAINING
FOREIGN MERCENARIES. SOME OF THE FUNDS FOR THE FNLA
AND UNITA ARE USED FOR PAYMENT OF SALARIES OF THE
FORCES FIGHTING FOR THE TWO GROUPS. THE COMPOSITION

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OF THESE FORCES, WHICH ARE UNDER FNLA AND UNITA
CONTROL, COULD POSSIBLY INCLUDE MERCENARIES.

BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US RECOGNIZE THAT OUR
RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ANTAGONISTIC AND COMPETITIVE
IN MANY AREAS. HENCE OUR EFFORTS TO TRY TO ESTABLISH
CERTAIN GUIDELINES OF BEHAVIOR TO INSULATE OUR RELATION-
SHIP FROM THE SHOCK OF UNNECESSARY CONFRONTATION. THE
PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT IN AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST
ASSUMES, HOWEVER, THAT THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN
US WILL REMAIN ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. THIS ASSUMPTION
CAN BE UPSET, OF COURSE, IF WE SLACKEN OUR DEFENSE
EFFORTS IN THE FACT OF A CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY
BUILD-UP. BUT THE BALANCE CAN ALSO BE UPSET IF, BY OUR
FAILURE TO REACT TO A SOVIET PROBE IN A DISTANT PART
OF THE WORLD, WE DEMONSTRATE THAT WE LACK THE WILL
TO USE THE POWER WHICH WE POSSESS.

AT THIS POINT IN OUR EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
USSR, I THINK THAT THE SIGNAL WHICH THE SENATE GAVE
TO THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW, AND TO THOSE
WAITING IN THE WINGS TO TAKE OVER THAT LEADERSHIB IS
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A MISLEADING AND DANGEROUS ONE.

THE SIGNAL THAT WE ARE TRANSMITTING, THE PRINCIPLE WE
SEEM TO BE SUPPORTING IS THAT EVEN IF THE SOVIET UNION

INTERVENES IN A MASSIVE WAY, AND EVEN IF CUBAN OR
OTHER TROOPS ARE USED AS AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THE
UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE EVEN
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE WHO ARE THREATENED.

CAN A COUNTRY FACED WITH THIS THREAT -- AND I ASK THIS
QUESTION IN UTTER SERIOUSNESS -- CAN A COUNTRY FACED
WITH THIS THREAT WITHOUT HOPE OF ASSISTANCE FROM US
BE EXPECTED TO RESIST? IS THIS WHAT THE CONGRESS
WANTS?

IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS AND AT
SOME INDEFINITE DATE IN THE FUTURE, AFRICAN NATIONALISM
WILL REASSERT ITSELF;EVEN IF THAT IS TRUE, ARE WE
PREPARED TO DEPEND ON THE FICKLENESS OF HISTORY TO
WORK FOR US? A COUNTRY WHICH IS THREATENED CANNOT
WAIT FOR HISTORY -- IT MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO YIELD
NOW. THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT IS SMALL SOLACE FOR THOSE
WHO MUST FACE LIFE TODAY.

SOME CHARGE THAT WE HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO COLLUSION WITH
SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER THE POLICIES
OF SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA DETERMINES ITS OWN

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POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN PERCEIVED INTERESTS.
WE HAVE NOT APPROVED OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN
ANGOLA AND WE DO NOT APPROVE IT NOW. WE WILL DETERMINE
OUR POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF OUR OWN INTERESTS AND IT
WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY SOUTH AFRICA.

IT IS ALSO CLAIMED THAT BECAUSE OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE
SIDE WHICH CAME TO BE AIDED BY SOUTH AFRICA, WE HAVE
LOST MUST INFLUENCE IN BLACK AFRICA. ONE CANNOT
GENERALIZE SO EASILY ABOUT THE AFRICANS' PERCEPTION
OF THE US AND SOVIET ROLES. THE FIRM STAND AT ADDIS
ABABA OF 22 OAU MEMBERS AGAINST OAU RECOGNITION OF
THE MPLA SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN. BEHIND THIS STAND,
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WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE US POSITION, WAS AWARENESS
THAT THE MPLA REPRESENTED ONLY A MINORITY OF ANGOLANS,
AND ALSO A GENUINE APPREHENSION OVER SOVIET, AS WELL
AS SOUTH AFRICAN, INTERVENTION.

LET ME REPEAT THAT OUR INTEREST IS IN AN AFRICAN
SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM. DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES
AMONG THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA, I AM FIRMLY

CONVINCED THAT, HAD THERE BEEN NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE
INITIATED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE AFRICANS WOULD HAVE
FOUND A SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLA PROBLEM. NO SINGLE
MOVEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN STRONG ENOUGH TO IMPOSE
ITSELF AND THE RESULTING SOLUTION WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA THAN A GOVERN-
MENT REPRESENTING ANY ONE MOVEMENT.

IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT WHAT WE DO IN THIS
SITUATION -- OR MORE IMPORTANTLY WHAT WE DON'T DO --
CAN BE DECISIVE IN SHAPING OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND IN DETERMINING WHETHER
THIS COUNTRY IS PREPARED TO PLAY THE ROLE WHICH ITS
POWER, ITS RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS FRIENDS LEGITIMATELY
DEMAND OF IT. IF WE FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE OUR DETER-
MINATION AND OUR WILL, THE FUTURE WILL INDEED BE BLEAK
FOR US AND OUR FRIENDS.

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